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Abstract 
 
The article uses evidence from an original survey of 200 top Commission officials to 
suggest that, despite some positive developments, the Kinnock reforms have led to the 
“bureaucratization” of the organization through the proliferation of burdensome rules and 
cumbersome procedures.  The article suggests that, unless reversed, the recent trend 
towards bureaucratization risks producing the opposite results than those intended by the 
modernizers.  The expanded body of rules helps guard the Commission against 
accusations of fraud and mismanagement, but it also risks creating a culture of risk 
aversion that paralyzes initiative and undermines autonomy.  Moreover, the 
bureaucratization of the Commission risks diffusing individual responsibility, hence 
exacerbating the problem it originally sought to solve.  Despite strong demands from the 
top management about the reversal of the trend towards bureaucratization, the article 
suggests that the political nature of the reform drive makes it hard to reverse it. 
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 Introduction 
 
Seven years after the administrative storm caused by the “Eurocleaners” of the Prodi 
Commission, the dust has started settling.  It is a good time, then, to take stock.  Have the 
ambitious modernization efforts managed to set in place a new administrative culture 
based on service?  Have the reforms enhanced the managerial capacity and effectiveness 
of the fifty-year-old organization?  And have they strengthened financial controls?  
Answers to these questions vary substantially depending on whom you ask.  The Prodi 
Commission, which “laid the groundwork for the most radical administrative 
transformation” since the creation of the organization, boasts that within five years it 
completed all the reform-related measures set out in its 2000 White Paper (European 
Commission 2005).  But Commission whistleblowers and auditors have argued that 
although the reforms are impressive on paper, in practice, the organization remains 
exposed to fraud and mismanagement.  Moreover, unions representing Commission 
officials have delivered damning appraisals of the reforms, blaming them for 
demoralizing staff and for creating a “dog-eat-dog” atmosphere within the organization.
1  
Scholarly observers have been more cautious in their analysis.  Some have noted the 
unprecedented pace and scope of the reform (e.g. Kassim 2004) while others pointed to 
its pathologies (e.g. Levy 2006). 
 
This article utilizes and extends the insights of earlier scholarly work to present the views 
of top European officials on the reform initiative.  Rather than relying on the claims of 
the modernizers and their outspoken critics, the article reports the beliefs of those who 
experienced the reform first-hand, nearly 200 top managers whom we surveyed in 2005 
through hourly personal interviews.  The timing of the interviews could not have been 
more opportune: by early 2005, the Commission completed all 98 measures included in 
its ambitious reform program and started considering ways to push the reform beyond its 
original mandate.  During this critical time, we asked officials to reflect on the 
modernization efforts and to evaluate the impact of the reforms on their working 
environment.  Top managers responded to a battery of questions about the structure of the 
Commission, about the recent changes in personnel policy and about their preferred 
course of future reforms. 
 
The emerging view from the top management of the organization is that, despite some 
positive developments, the recent reforms have led to the “bureaucratization” of the 
Commission through the proliferation of burdensome rules and cumbersome procedures.  
The article suggests that, unless reversed, the recent trend towards bureaucratization risks 
producing the opposite results than those intended by the modernizers.  The expanded 
body of rules helps guard the Commission against accusations of fraud and 
mismanagement, but it also risks creating a culture of risk aversion that paralyzes 
initiative and undermines autonomy.  Moreover, the bureaucratization of the Commission 
risks diffusing individual responsibility, hence exacerbating the problem it originally 
sought to solve. 
 
                                                  
1 See, for example, Peter Chapman, “Kinnock staff reforms ‘not working’ claim unions” European Voice, 
20 November 2003.  
Up until the fall of the Santer Commission, in March 1999, the European Commission 
seemed to successfully resist repeated calls for reform.  The first section of this paper 
briefly describes previous efforts to reform the workings of the organization before 
examining the crisis that catalyzed the modernization efforts.  The third section provides 
a brief overview of the reform program and the fourth offers an “on paper” assessment of 
the reform.  The fifth and lengthiest section reports the views of the Commission’s top 
management on the reforms and the sixth discusses the findings of the survey.  The 
article ends with some concluding thoughts on the prospects of improving the current 
workings of the organization. 
 
Previous modernization efforts 
 
To appreciate the pace and scope of the recent reforms it is important to place them in 
historical perspective.  This section provides a brief historical overview of earlier 
modernization efforts to point to the obstacles they confronted but also, to highlight 
significant continuities in reform efforts.  Such efforts date back to the late 1970s, when 
an Independent Review Body chaired by Dirk Spierenburg noted that the “internal 
weaknesses” of the Commission reinforced its growing ineffectiveness.  The Spierenburg 
Report urged reducing the number of administrative units and commissioners, 
strengthening the position of Directors-General, improving the distribution of the 8.300 
officials across units and encouraging their mobility.  Foreshadowing subsequent reforms 
efforts, the Report also called for the use of outside expertise and for the enhancement of 
management qualities (Spierenburg 1979).  The suggestions of the Spierenburg Report 
received strong endorsement from another committee appointed in 1978 by the Council 
to “to consider adjustments to the machinery and procedures of the Community 
institutions.”  Published shortly after the Spierenburg study, the “Report of the Three 
Wise Men” made a similar diagnosis of the problem and gave a parallel prescription for 
resolving administrative inefficiencies in the Commission (Biesheuvel, Marjolin and Dell 
1979).  But the prescriptions of the two independent bodies fell, initially, on deaf ears.  
Apart from a minor decrease in the number of administrative units, the European Council 
and staff representatives resisted modernization pressures. 
 
Throughout the early 1980s, administrative reform remained low on the priorities of the 
Commission, which focused, instead, on the enlargement of the Community and the 
resolution of bitter budgetary disputes among member states.  But the expansionist 
agenda of the Delors Commission and the enormous demands placed on the Commission 
by the implementation of the common market project exacerbated the organizational 
deficiencies highlighted by the Spierenburg committee.  Moreover, the advent of New 
Public Management (NPM) in Britain, New Zealand and Australia reinforced calls for 
focusing on the managerial capacity of the organization.  Responding to such calls, the 
new commissioner for Personnel and Administration, Henning Christophersen, used his 
modernization experience in Denmark to initiate a new reform effort.  Under the 
guidance of Richard Hay, the Director General for Personnel Administration, the effort 
focused on strengthening the managerial skills of Commission officials and on deploying 
staff more efficiently through a five-year rolling program for the use of staff resources.  Moreover, there was an attempt to simplify internal procedures and to improve 
recruitment practices.  Finally, the modernizers tried to shift financial responsibility to the 
Directors-Generals and to encourage them to delegate authority to lower levels in each 
directorate.  With the end date of the common market approaching, the reformers sought 
to forge “a new model of public administration” with the aim of avoiding “Eurocracy” 
(Hay 1989: 42-46; here 51-52).  The reforms had brought about some incremental 
improvements to the workings of the Commission but fell short of forging a new 
administrative model.  Despite some minor steps toward improving its workings, the 
Commission continued to suffer from significant deficiencies in the way it deployed and 
managed human and financial resources (European Commission 1990).   
 
By the early 1990s, the modernization effort was largely sidelined by the energetic push 
of the Delors Commission for economic and monetary integration.  The launching of the 
single market project, the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty and the preparation for 
monetary integration extended the Commission’s field of activity and increased its 
administrative workload to unmanageable levels.  Along with the Commission’s chronic 
administrative problems, the work overload created new calls for reform.  Not 
surprisingly, a 1994 report on the state of the administration and its effectiveness “found 
that many the problems first identified by the Spierenburg Report fifteen years before had 
never been satisfactorily resolved, even if some progress had been made in fits and starts 
in the interim” (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 186).  The report was disregarded by Delors, 
who continued until the end of his tenure, in 1995, to resist calls to reorganize the 
Commission. 
 
Unlike Delors, Jacques Santer made administrative reform a priority for the incoming 
Commission.  Lacking the political clout and backing that his predecessor enjoyed, 
Santer focused on consolidating the achievements of the Delors Commission by 
improving the efficiency and accountability of the organization.  His principal 
organizational strategy was “less action, more efficiently” (Cini 2002: 8).  The reform 
initiative followed three distinct phases labeled Sound and Efficient Financial 
Management (SEM 2000), Modernization of Administration and Personnel Policy (MAP 
2000) and “Designing tomorrow’s Commission” (DECODE).  The SEM program was 
launched in 1995 to promote sound and efficient management of financial resources.  It 
sought to make the cost of political decisions clearer, to provide protection against fraud 
and to improve financial management procedures.  The second phase of the Santer 
modernization program focused on administration and personnel policy.  MAP 2000 
“centered on decentralization and devolution of powers, simplification of procedures and 
the identification and application of new approaches in the administration and 
management of human resources.”  The Commission made an effort to devolve powers to 
individual directorates and departments, which would be made responsible for the 
management of their resources (European Commission 1998).  In 1997, the Commission 
combined SEM and MAP with a more comprehensive screening process, DECODE, that 
sought to “change the Commission’s management culture and prepare it for its tasks in 
2000 and beyond” (European Commission 1999).  It was largely a fact-finding 
examination of the Commission’s organization and operations that was intended to 
provide an updated picture of its activities, resources and procedures (Metcalfe 2003: 4).  But the modernization effort suffered a major setback when a leaked report about 
personnel policy caused strike action by staff unions, undermining the credibility of the 
modernization push and slowing it down.  In response to staff reactions, the Commission 
established a group made up of staff and management representatives under David 
Williamson, to examine a wide range of personnel issues.  The findings of the 
Williamson group as well as those of the twelve DECODE groups were published after 
the resignation of the Santer Commission and set the basis for the modernization agenda 
of the Prodi Commission (Stevens and Stevens 2001: 186-194).  
 
Crisis, Continuity and Change 
 
By 1999, the modernization effort of the Santer Commission became overshadowed by 
the allegations of fraud, mismanagement and nepotism that led to its resignation in 
March.  The allegations led to a motion of censure by the European Parliament (EP) 
against the Commission in January, which failed by a margin of 61 votes.  In response to 
these pressures from the EP, the Santer Commission agreed to let a Committee of 
Independent Experts investigate the allegations and to report back within six weeks.  The 
basic problem identified by the report was mismanagement: commissioners lost control 
of their departments, failed to respond effectively to chronic problems of understaffing, 
and avoided penalizing those responsible for irregularities.  The prescribed solution, then, 
was the enhancement of the managerial capacity of the Commission, through an 
improvement in the allocation and control of its resources.  Moreover, in light of some 
evidence of favoritism, the Committee also suggested that commissioners abide by 
“minimum standards of public life.”  Overall, although the Committee found no evidence 
of direct involvement of the commissioners in fraud, it held them responsible for failing 
to prevent it.  Pointing to a serious lack of accountability, the Committee concluded that 
“it is becoming increasingly difficult to find anyone that has even the slightest sense of 
responsibility” in the Commission (Committee of Independent Experts 1999: 144).  Its 
damning critique led to the immediate resignation of the Santer Commission on 15 March 
1999 and to its replacement by the Prodi Commission.  
 
The institutional crisis that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission exposed the 
organizational deficiencies of the Commission and highlighted the urgent need for 
reform.  In light of the findings of the Committee of Independent Experts, both the 
Parliament and the Council gave the incoming Commission a strong mandate to 
modernize the workings of the organization.  Responding to institutional – but also, to 
popular pressures – Prodi made administrative reform one of his top priorities.  Signaling 
the strong commitment of the new Commission to reform, Prodi appointed a Vice-
President, the former Labor Party leader, Neil Kinnock, in charge of the modernization 
project.  Only a few months after taking office, the Commission published a White Paper 
that detailed its reform proposals.  The modernization effort drew from the findings of the 
two reports published by the Committee of Independent Experts and on a series of 
internal reports, including that of Williamson group and the DECODE assessment.  This 
gave a sense of continuity between the Kinnock and earlier reforms (Christiansen 2004: 
112-113) as a number of the proposed measures had been either initiated or suggested by 
previous Commissions. But, as the White Paper rightly noted, the scope and ambition of the Prodi initiative far exceeded that of any previous reform exercise (European 
Commission 2000b: 6).  For not only were some of suggestions novel, but they also came 
with tight deadlines for completion and clear assignments of tasks to the various 
directorates or units.  More importantly, though, the Kinnock reforms were part of a 
comprehensive and cohesive reform strategy that was driven by a political vision to 
change the workings of the Commission. 
 
The Kinnock reforms 
 
The reform initiative of the Prodi Commission was launched in March 2000 with the 
approval and publication of the White Paper.  The overall reform strategy of the 
Commission was divided into four themes set out in the first part of the White Paper.  
The second part detailed an action plan of 98 measures, deadlines for their 
implementation and the actors responsible for their execution (European Commission 
2000b; 2000c).  The first and overarching theme of the modernization push was the 
development of a “culture based on service.”  As soon as it took office the Prodi 
Commission agreed on new standards of behavior for Commissioners and on a code for 
“good administrative behavior.”  Moreover, it sought to enhance public access to EU 
documents, to improve the dialogue with civil society, to speed up payments to 
contractors and to build up the technological infrastructure of the organization.  There 
was also an effort to codify relations with the EP, in light of institutional changes brought 
about by the Amsterdam Treaty.  Most of the eleven measures detailed under the 
“culture” theme were improvements on actions initiated by previous Commissions.  As 
Kinnock admits, the emphasis on culture was largely a “convenient, spray-on label to 
summarize inherited organizational custom” (Kinnock 2004: 8). 
 
The second theme focused on the efficient allocation and use of resources based on the 
prioritization of policy outputs.  Echoing NPM-type ideas implemented earlier in Anglo-
Saxon countries (e.g. Hood 1991; Suleiman 2003), the White Paper proposed a 
reassessment of existing Commission priorities and the establishment of new ones.  This 
would set the basis for the diversion of resources to those areas to which they were likely 
to give the best policy outputs.  The overall goal was to encourage the various 
directorates and departments to focus more on results, rather than procedures – what the 
White Paper termed “Activity-Based Management.”  To facilitate this, the Commission 
would formulate an annual policy strategy to set the basis for the work program of each 
individual administrative unit.  The assignment of work programs would help 
decentralize decision making and promote personal responsibility.  It would also make it 
easier to determine the amount of resources required to achieve specific policy outputs.  
To encourage the more efficient allocation of resources, the White Paper proposed the 
formulation of a comprehensive framework for externalizing activities – e.g. outsourcing. 
 
The third theme of the reform initiative was the improvement of financial management 
and control as well as the establishment of more robust audit procedures.  This part of the 
modernization project was tightly connected to the previous one.  Activity-based 
management would facilitate the determination of a work program for each official, 
specify output expectations and devolve responsibility for their completion.  Those officials making operational decisions involving expenditure would also assume financial 
responsibility.  To deal with criticism about lack of responsibility and to address 
problems related to the increasing number of financial transactions – which doubled to 
620,000 per year in five years – the Commission proposed the decentralization of 
financial control.  Directors-General would be made responsible for adequate controls of 
their departments and managers would be held accountable for the financial decisions 
they take.  According to this scheme, each unit would develop an independent audit 
capability.  Moreover, the Commission proposed to set up two additional bodies, the 
Central Financial Service and Internal Audit Service, to advice and assist the managers 
and directors with financial control.  In addition, an Audit Progress Committee would 
control audit processes, oversee the implementation of audit recommendations and assess 
the quality of audit work.  Finally, there would be measures to maximize the prevention 
of financial irregularity through improvements of existing procedures. 
 
The last and lengthiest theme of the reform project related to the modernization of human 
resources policy from recruitment to retirement.  In line with its earlier proposals, the 
Commission sought to strengthen the middle-management by devolving granting Heads 
of Unit autonomy for operational and financial decisions.  Moreover, it identified 
management ability as the most important criterion for appointments.  With regards to 
recruitment, the White Paper proposed to improve the organization of open competitions 
and tests by taking into account the best practices in national and international 
administrations.  One of the most notable suggestions regarded the establishment a more 
linear career structure that would increase the incentives for improving performance.  
Appraisals would be made with the attribution of points and, consequently, promotion 
would depend mostly on merit, rather than seniority.  Over-performance would be 
awarded and under-performance would be dealt with more systematically.  To improve 
the working environment, the Commission would grant the right to family leave, 
introduce more flexible working hours and strengthen the existing equal opportunities 
scheme.  The White Paper also suggested improving the disciplinary and “whistle-
blowing” systems.   
 
The Commission hoped to complete the 98 reform-related actions outlined in the White 
paper within two years and to review the progress of the reform in 2002.  By February 
2003, when it published its first comprehensive analysis of the reform effort, it could 
claim the completion of 87 out of the 98 actions.  The few delays related to the 
development of the new procurements and accounting systems.  There was also some lag 
with work programs, internal controls and project management.  Unsurprisingly, 
personnel policy proved to be the most contentious issue causing significant tension 
between the Commission and the unions.  The new set of Staff Regulations was adopted 
in May 2004 after a prolonged period of negotiations with staff representatives.  
Nevertheless, some of the most innovative aspects of the reform, like the new appraisal 
system and the new structure were adopted much earlier.  By 2005, the Commission 
claimed the completion of all 98 actions (Table 1). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here]   
  
 
 
 
Assessing the reform 
 
The swift completion of the action plan has largely been taken as a mark of its success.  
The Kinnock reforms have come to be regarded as “a historic accomplishment” (Kassim 
2004: 33) or as a remarkable achievement that far exceeds previous modernization efforts 
(Bauer 2007: 52).  Indeed, on a number of fronts the Commission has managed to make 
substantial progress.  For example, the average number of days it took for the 
Commission to make a payment decreased from 54 in 1999 to 42.9 in 2003. And in 2003, 
between 80-90% of public mail was replied to within the standard deadline compared 
with 70% in 2002.  Moreover, the number of days spent for employee training increased 
from 6.9 in 2001 to 8.32 by 2003.  During that year, 7.000 Commission officials 
participated in financial training and 500 middle managers took management courses.  
There was also progress in the implementation of the equal opportunities scheme: the 
number of female top managers increased from 22 in 1998 to 39 in 2003 and the number 
of incoming female A-grade officials increased from 27.6% in 2002 to 33.3% (European 
Commission 2003; 2004).   
 
But apart from the progress achieved on these specific areas, the overall impact of the 
reform on the workings of the organization is harder to assess.  This is largely because a 
considerable number of reform-related tasks involved the drafting of proposals, reviews 
or rules and setting up new institutions, systems or committees.  The completion of such 
tasks set the basis for changing but it did not necessarily improve the workings of the 
Commission.  Moreover, the reform has largely been assessed on the basis of task 
completion rather than actual performance.  Despite the emphasis of the reformers on 
output, there is a peculiar absence of specific indicators for measuring the relative success 
of the reform.  The few indicators used by the Kinnock team to assess progress in the 
implementation of the reforms have mostly been put in place after the reform was well on 
its way.  Using different criteria, Levy (2006) presents a strikingly different picture of the 
modernization effort than the one given by the Commission.  He argues that the reform 
increased the workload of the officials and created more dependency relationships 
through the establishment of new processes.  His “on-paper” analysis suggests that by 
2004 the Commission implemented fully or partly only half of the actions it claimed it 
had completed.  This negative assessment of the modernization effort confirms insiders’ 
claims that the reform failed to bring about the desired effects. One of them, former chief 
accountant Marta Adreasen, was suspended in 2002 after blowing the whistle on the 
Commission’s financial control mechanisms.  Her claims were substantiated by a leaked 
report from the internal auditor that noted many procedural or systemic deficiencies on 
reform-related tasks that were marked, in the 2003 review, as completed (European 
Commission 2004: 63-69).  Further doubt about the effectiveness of the reforms was cast 
by the financial irregularities discovered in Eurostat during 2003. 
 
The view from the top  
Our survey of nearly 200 top Commission officials presents a different view of the 
modernization effort.  The survey was carried out between March and December 2005 
through semi-structured interview and it sought to build on the findings of Liesbet 
Hooghe’s impressive work on the Commission (e.g. Hooghe 2001).  All top officials 
were asked in writing to participate in the survey and a representative sample – 68% of 
Directors-General, 59% of Depute Directors-General and 52% of Directors – granted us 
hourly interviews.  To this notable pool of 133 top managers, we added a convenient 
sample of 55 middle managers or Heads of Unit to explore if views about administrative 
reform vary across managerial levels.  The sample includes officials from all directorates 
and from most of the Commission’s general and internal services.  The geographical 
distribution of the sample is also balanced.  More than half of the officials come from the 
five most populous member states: Britain (13%), France (13%), Spain (11%), Germany 
(10%) and Italy (10%).  The Belgians make up 10% of the sample, the Dutch 6% and the 
Greeks another 6%, while only 2% come from the 10 new members states.  Almost half 
(45%) of the interviewees have been trained as social scientists, 28% have degrees in the 
natural sciences and 23% have a law degree.  As Hooghe also found (2001: 54), four out 
of ten top officials have received at least one educational degree away from their country 
of origin.  The overwhelming majority of the officials we interviewed had worked for the 
Commission for at least 10 years: 40% joined the Commission between 1986 and1995; 
28% joined the preceding decade; and 17% before 1976.  But despite their long tenure in 
this supranational organization and their lengthy leave from their home country, top 
officials continue to follow national politics with great interest.  Asked how closely they 
follow politics in their own countries, only 7% responded “not much” compared to 41% 
who said “very closely,” 34% who replied “closely” and 19% who answered “pretty 
much.”  Moreover, four out five still vote in national elections.
2  What do they vote for?  
Mostly for the Left, if one is to take into account their self-placement on a 1-10 Left-
Right scale: 55% placed themselves between 2 and 4.5, 19% on 5 and 26% between 5.5 
and 8. 
 
Apart from these background questions, the survey asked top officials about their 
professional experience, the organizational culture of the Commission and their vision of 
the European Union.  A battery of five questions dealt specifically with the organizational 
structure of the Commission and with the Kinnock reforms.  The survey followed the 
completion of all reform-related actions and anticipated the internal deliberations about 
the future of the modernization drive.  Top Commission officials had experienced first-
hand the intense efforts to change the workings of the organization and were best placed 
to assess its outcome.  Along with the middle management, top officials lifted the 
heaviest burden of the modernization drive: they had to follow new appraisal procedures, 
implement financial controls in their units and oversee the shift to activity-based 
management.   The survey sought to tap into their first-hand knowledge by asking them 
to comment on the overall workings of the Commission and to assess the most 
contentious part of the Kinnock reforms, that relating to the management of human 
resources.  During a time when the Barroso Commission was discussing the future of the 
                                                  
2 The number would be considerably higher if one were to count British nationals, who are not allowed to 
vote in British elections. reform initiative, the survey also asked officials to sketch the contours of future reforms.  
The remainder of the article records their responses. 
 
Not a hierarchical beast 
 
Overall, top officials do not seem to share the commonly held view that the Commission 
is hierarchically structured, along the lines of the French and German bureaucracy.  Out 
of the 189 officials that responded to this question, 110 or 58% “disagreed” or “strongly 
disagreed” with the notion that the Commission is “too hierarchical.”  Views about the 
structure of the Commission cut across rank, but not across levels of seniority.  
Unsurprisingly, newer employees are more likely to view the Commission as being 
hierarchical than those who have worked for the Commission longer (Table 2).  Of 
course, in such a multicultural organization perceptions of hierarchy are likely to vary 
significantly depending on one’s national basis for comparison.  Many of the respondents 
explicitly compared the Commission with national administrations.  As one of them put 
it, “Yes, I agree it is hierarchical, but only because I am Swedish.” A number of the 
respondents associated the hierarchical nature of the Commission with its resemblance of 
the French and German administrative models; or, with the emphasis that south and 
continental administrations place on strict hierarchy.  Others presented a much more 
nuanced picture, relating the degree of hierarchy to the size, function and culture of each 
individual directorate.  Another frequent response was that it largely depends on the 
personality of the person in charge and – again – their national background.  In the words 
of a British director, “the degree of hierarchy depends a lot on the culture of the specific 
DG and on the person who heads it.  In DG Agriculture, successive Directors General 
have been French and therefore brought about hierarchical culture.”  Interestingly, while 
many officials despise the hierarchical nature of the institution, others think it is “a 
necessary evil,” as there is no other way to run a “big complex organization.”   Despite 
other misgivings with the workings of the organization, many officials think that the 
Commission has become less hierarchical over time.  Out of the one hundred officials 
that commented extensively on the question about hierarchy, thirteen noted an 
improvement from before, mostly in terms of accessibility to the top as well as flexibility.  
None of the officials suggested that the Commission became more hierarchical (Table 3). 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Merit-based recruitment 
 
Apart from their views on the overall structure of the Commission, the survey also asked 
officials to comment on the overhaul of personnel policy.  Through changes in the 
management of human resources, the Commission mainly aimed at boosting staff 
motivation and enhancing meritocracy (European Commission 2005: 3).   But the reform 
of personnel policy proved to be the most contentious aspect of the modernization effort. 
Not surprisingly, some of the proposed changes in personnel policy initially met stiff 
resistance from employee unions and the revision of Staff Regulations was delayed until May 2004.  The survey sought to tap into the experiences of top managers in the 
implementation of the personnel reforms.  To do so, it focused on one of the most 
sensitive components of the reform package, the new staff appraisal and promotion 
system.  By 2005, when we conducted the survey, the Prodi Commission had completed 
two full exercises of the new system.  Due to the resistance these exercises met from 
staff, in March 2004 it commissioned an in-depth external evaluation of the system, “with 
a view to improving, in particular, the link between merit and promotion” (European 
Commission 2005: 7).  Our survey, then, sought to examine exactly this: the capacity of 
the new system to reward merit.  After a quick reference to the Kinnock reforms, we 
asked top officials whether the promotion system was fully merit-based.  As a control, we 
asked a similar question about a much less sensitive issue, the recruitment of new 
officials. 
 
The views of top officials on the recruitment procedures of the Commission are generally 
positive.  More than half of the respondents think that recruitment is “fully merit-based” 
and another 40% think that it is “mostly merit-based.”  Only 7% think that recruitment is 
“not merit-based at all.”  Interestingly, the views of top officials vary considerably 
depending on their rank and experience.  The higher up on the hierarchy and the more 
their years of service in the Commission, the more likely they are to think that the 
recruitment process is fully-merit-based.  Hence, only 36% of Heads of Unit consider 
recruitment to be fully merit-based compared to 73% of Directors-General; and only 40% 
of the newest officials think so compared to 72% of the officials with the lengthiest 
service (Table 4).  Although most officials think that recruitment is based on merit, many 
think that the open competitions might be rewarding the wrong types of merit.  As one of 
the respondents noted, “recruitment is fully merit-based, but the wrong merit is being 
tested.  People who are recruited can often lack the skills necessary to complete particular 
tasks.”  Moreover, many interviewees distinguished between recruitment for lower and 
higher ranks: “The higher you get, the less merit-based the system becomes, and the more 
important political and nationality considerations become.”  For many top officials, there 
is a significant element of randomness in the procedure, as the Commission hires only a 
tiny fraction of the 50 thousand people who take its exams.  And for others, the process is 
too bureaucratic and rigid, causing delays in resourcing units. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Promotion: Mixed picture 
 
The responses of top officials to the question about promotion paint a less rosy picture 
than the one given by their thoughts on recruitment.  Whereas half of the survey 
respondents think that recruitment is “fully merit-based,” only 16% view promotion to be 
so.  The vast majority of them or 72% think that promotion is “mostly merit-based,” 
while 12% think that the process is not merit-based at all.  Naturally, the percentage of 
those who hold positive views of the promotion process decreases along with rank and 
seniority.  The higher officials are on the ladder the more favorable their view of the 
process that got them there.  Hence, while 29% of Directors-General view promotion as 
being fully based on merit, only 10% of Heads of Unit think so.  Interestingly, 21% of middle managers think that the system is not merit-based at all, compared to a mere 3% 
of top managers (Table 4).   
 
Many top officials think that, apart from merit, various other considerations are taken into 
account when promotion is decided.  Among those who gave extensive responses to the 
question about promotion, a significant number noted that seniority is still important, in 
part due to the concessions Kinnock had to make to the trade unions.  Many others 
suggested that politics or nationality is still important, especially for high ranking 
officials (Table 5).  As a Head of Unit noted, “I know I will never be a Director-General 
because there are already three Spaniards.”  A large number of the respondents (55) 
responded to the question by comparing the current state of affairs with the previous one.  
The majority of them (31) noted an improvement from before, 16 said that things stayed 
as before and only 8 of them said that things had become worse.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Commenting on specific aspects of the new appraisal and promotion system, top officials 
painted a mixed picture.  Many of them said that the new system increased transparency 
and helped make top managers more accountable for their decisions.  A typical response 
was that “the Kinnock reforms made things more transparent but at the top of the 
organization nationality still counts.”  Another respondent noted: “Yes to Kinnock!  The 
system is more transparent now and it is easier to explain decisions to the staff.”  
Similarly another remarked: “indeed, it is more merit based now than in past.  The old 
system wasn’t that bad.  But this one is more transparent.”  But many officials also noted 
negative aspects of the new promotion system.  Many were particularly critical of the 
point-based appraisal system.  The words and phrases used to describe it should suffice to 
give the overall picture: stressful, awful, demotivating, poisonous, tension-creating, bad 
for teamwork, etc.  Moreover, a number of officials pointed out that the increase in 
transparency came at the cost of cumbersome procedures that overburden managers. 
“Now the system is clean and clear.  But the exercise is very complicated and heavy and 
the process has become very time-consuming.”  Others think that the administrative cost 
has come at no extra benefit:  “The Kinnock reforms did not improve things.  They 
haven’t really changed things…  The old system was merit based; the new system just 
made things more cumbersome.”  Yet others were even more negative: “This Anglo-
Saxon, private-sector system is probably making things less efficient.  It is making things 
worse, much more cumbersome.  Most private companies are abandoning this system.”   
 
Administrative overdrive? 
 
The misgivings of top European officials about the cumbersomeness of the new 
personnel policy are largely in line with their views about the expanding body of rules 
that governs the Commission’s workings.  The vast majority of our interviewees (60%) 
“strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement that the Commission is “too bound by 
rules.”  As shown before, this contrasts with their views on the overall structure of the 
Commission.  The cross tabulation of their responses on rule-boundedness shows that 
they cut across rank or seniority (Table 6).  Top officials criticize the “tendency toward the bureaucratization” brought about by the Kinnock reforms, especially with regards to 
financial rules.  As a Director General complained, “financial controls were weak; now 
they are too strong.  Regardless of whether you are a big or a small spender, you have the 
same rules.”  According to some officials, the Kinnock reforms have brought about an 
“administrative overdrive” that led to the “proliferation of controllers” and put officials 
on guard to protect themselves.  As one official noted in exasperation, “it has gotten out 
of hand!  There are too many cooks.  There’s a ‘security’ mania.  Everybody is afraid of 
taking risks.”  Some officials see the expansion in the body of rules as necessary, in order 
to thwart pressures from member states against the Commission, particularly after the 
Santer resignation.  But although they understand this as a necessary step to respond to 
public criticism, they complain that the “reform pendulum swung too far” and that 
“exaggerated controls have been put in place” to “overcompensate for the previous 
crisis.” 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, the view emerging from the top of the organization is that the Kinnock reforms 
have achieved progress in some areas but at the cost of introducing burdensome rules and 
cumbersome procedures.  The top management thinks that the Commission is not as 
hierarchical as it is often portrayed and that in recent years it has become less 
hierarchical.  The vast majority of the 200 interviewees also think that the Commission 
uses recruitment and promotion systems that are largely meritocratic, despite the various 
national or political considerations that it is compelled to take into account.  But these 
positive developments should not conceal what appears to be a general trend towards the 
bureaucratization of the Commission.  The vast majority of surveyed officials think that 
the organization is too bound by internal rules at the detriment of individual initiative.  
They view the procedural turn of the past few years as an administrative overdrive that 
undermines the willingness of officials to take risks.  Moreover, the growing body of 
rules and regulations is thought to be burdensome, frustrating and demotivating.  An 
example is the introduction of the new promotion system, which created lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures. 
 
The trend towards the bureaucratization of the Commission has generated strong 
demands among its top management for simplifying and streamlining the expanded body 
of rules that have been set in place the past few years.  This demand was expressed 
unequivocally when we asked officials which reforms they would like to see 
implemented in the future.  Out of the 242 suggestions we recorded, more than a third 
(35.4%) were about the simplification of the rules or procedures governing the 
organization.  Another 14% regarded the streamlining of the organization and its rules 
(Table 7).  The extensive remarks of some officials are telling of their exasperation: “In 
the future, the Commission has to simplify procedures. I can’t go to a meeting without 
getting 50 signatures!”  “We need to simplify things a lot!”  “Much more simplified, 
logical, practical rules are needed.  To control one Euro you spend a lot of money, it’s 
ridiculous.”  The administrative reforms of the past years are not only threatening efficiency, but more importantly, they seem to be undermining the capacity of the 
Commission to take risks and to innovate.  Many officials note that the introduction of so 
many rules has made people “obsessed with risk.”  They believe that “there is a 
tremendous amount of risk aversion in the Commission.”  “People have become afraid of 
fraud and this fear is paralyzing” as fewer are willing to take initiatives.  “We need to be 
able to take risks.  We need to distinguish between errors and fraud.  We now want zero 
errors, which can't work.”  At the same time, the enforcement of lengthy procedures 
seems to diffuse responsibility and to undermine individual autonomy.  This might 
explain why 9.5% of the suggestions were about empowering employees by granting 
them more autonomy.  In thinking about future reforms, many officials noted that “the 
responsibilization or the empowering of officials” is the way forward.  For others, 
though, this might still be a risky approach.  A considerable number of officials argued 
that no more reform should be undertaken before the organization is given time to digest 
the previous changes.  As one official characteristically put it, “the past eight years have 
witnessed permanent reform.  The behavioral rules of the game are changing every two 
years.  The biggest future reform, then, would be to have a pause in the reform process.  
We need to stop for a while.” 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political storm that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission set in motion the 
most ambitious reform initiative the organization has ever witnessed.  Now that the dust 
has started settling, it appears that the reform pendulum has swung too far.  Although 
significant progress has been achieved, it has come at the expense of increasing 
bureaucratization.  The growing body of internal rules set in place to keep officials 
accountable limits their autonomy, stifles initiative and diffuses responsibility.  This 
might not have been so problematic for any national administration.  For the 
Commission, though, the trend towards bureaucratization is particularly troublesome 
because of its unique institutional role in the European Union as policy innovator.  To the 
extent that bureaucratization limits the discretionary powers of individual officials, it 
tends to undermine the Commission’s capacity to formulate innovative policies and 
hence, its ability to push its supranational agenda.  
 
It might be time, then, to consider swinging the pendulum back by simplifying and 
streamlining the body of rules and regulations that govern the workings of the European 
Commission.  To its credit, the Barroso Commission recognizes the need for reversing 
the current trend towards bureaucratization.  In its report to the European Parliament on 
the “reform beyond the reform mandate,” the Commission acknowledges the need to 
strike a “better balance between the costs and benefits of control.”  It sets the 
“simplification of procedures and working methods” as its “cross-cutting objective” and 
wants to streamline some of the newly-introduced controls “to achieve productivity 
gains” (2005: 12).  But how easy will it be to roll back the vast body of rules that have 
been put in place to keep the Commission accountable?  Can the trend towards bureaucratization be reversed?  Can the reform pendulum now swing in the other 
direction? 
 
There are important reasons to doubt this.  The recent reform drive resulted from a 
legitimacy crisis that created strong public demands for making the Commission more 
accountable.  In response to such demands, both the European Council and the European 
Parliament invested considerable political capital in the reform project.  The Prodi 
Commission did not only have a comprehensive modernization plan but it also had the 
political backing to implement it.  Any plan to reverse the course set out by the Prodi 
Commission by simplifying the cumbersome rules and by rationalizing the exaggerated 
controls that have been put in place, would require at least as much political backing.  
Can the Commission expect such support in the foreseeable future?  Probably not.  In the 
coming years, it is unlikely that the political patrons of the Commission will risk their 
political capital to reverse the course towards bureaucratization and to grant the 
Commission more discretionary power.  Rising levels of Euro-scepticism and growing 
public anxieties over the loss of national sovereignty are likely to be strong impediments 
against the return to the era of political discretion and entrepreneurship.  Although the 
reform pendulum has swung too far, it is unlikely to swing in the other direction any time 
soon. 
 
 Table 1: Progress in implementing the 2000 action plan
2000 2003 2004 2005
Service-based culture 11 9 9.5 11
Priority setting and resource allocation 9 8 9 9
Financial management, audit and control 42 38 42 42
Human resources 36 32 35 36
Total 98 87 95.5 98
Source: European Commission; various reports on reform.  
   
 
Position (N=183) No Yes
DG/DDG 58 42
D  63 37
HU 50 50
Total 58 42
Seniority (N=172) No Yes
0-10 years 46 54
11-20 53 47
21-30 71 29
>30 72 28
Total 60 40
Table 2: Question: Some say the 
Commission is too hierarchical.  Do you 
agree? (%)
 
 
Less hierarchical than (national) administrations 6
As hierarchical as (national) administrations 10
More hierarchical than (national) administration 6
Improved from before 13
Same as before 1
Depends on Directorate 8
Depends on D/DG/Commissioner 11
Hierarchy is necessary 10
Easy access to top 8
Flexible 6
Others 30
Total 109
Table 3: Remarks to question if Commission is too 
hierarchical (N=100)*
*Some respondents touched on several themes, and their 
remarks were counted more than once.  
 Recruitment merit-based (%)
Position (N=183) Fully Mostly Not at all
DG/DDG 73 27 0
D  56 35 9
HU 36 55 9
Total 52 40 7
Seniority (N=172) Fully Mostly Not at all
0-10 years 40 48 12
11-20 49 42 9
21-30 55 39 6
>30 72 28 0
Total 53 39 8
Promotion merit-based (%)
 Position (N=183) Fully Mostly Not at all
DG/DDG 29 68 3
D  17 74 9
HU 10 69 21
Total 16 72 12
Seniority (N=166) Fully Mostly Not at all
0-10 years 8 68 24
11-20 17 69 14
21-30 14 80 6
>30 36 57 7
Total 18 70 12
Table 4: Question: One of the most important set of 
reforms in the recent past, the Kinnock Reforms, dealt with 
the issue of recruitment/promotion.  Do you think 
recruitment/promotion in the Commission is fully merit-
based?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mostly merit-based but…
...nationality also important 10
...connections also important 7
...seniority also important 19
...politics also important 16
...gender also important 1
...visibility also important 3
…only up to a certain rank 9
Comparison across time
Improved from before 31
Same as before  16
Worse than before 8
Positive and Negative Aspects
More transparent/more accountability 18
Point-system has negative effects 14
More rigid/cumbersome/ 
bureaucratic/complicated 28
Other 34
Total 214
Table 5: Responses to question whether 
promotion is merit-based (N=140)*
*Some respondents touched on several 
themes, and their remarks were counted 
more than once.  
 
 Position (N=183) No Yes
DG/DDG 38 62
D  37 63
HU 45 55
Total 40 60
Seniority (N=166) No Yes
0-10 years 25 75
11-20 44 56
21-30 42 58
>30 36 64
Total 39 61
Table 6: Question: Some say the 
Commission is too bound by rules.  Do you 
agree? (%)
 
 
 
 
 Reforms 
Mentioned %
Streamlining 34 14.0
Simplifying 86 35.5
Devolve responsibility/More autonomy 23 9.5
None 23 9.5
Don't know 14 5.8
Outsourcing 8 3.3
Resourcing/Increase resources 4 1.7
Flexibility 9 3.7
Coordination 8 3.3
Other 33 13.6
Total 242 100.0
Table 7: Question: What kind of reforms, if any, would you like 
to see implemented in the future? (N=182)
 Bibliography 
 
Bauer, M. (2007) ‘The Politics of Reforming the European Commission’ in M. Bauer and 
C. Knill (eds.), Management Reforms in International Organizations, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 51-69. 
 
Bauer, M. (2005) ‘The European Commission’ in P. van der Hoek (ed.) Handbook of 
Public Administration and Policy in the European Union, New York: Taylor & Francis, 
pp. 149-176. 
 
Biesheubel, B., E. Bell and R. Marjolin (1979) Report on operation of European 
institutions, October 1979. 
 
Cini, M. (2002) ‘Reforming the European Commission: discourse, culture and planned 
change’ in M. O. Hosli, A. van Deemen and M. Widgren (eds) Institutional challenges in 
the European Union, London: Roudlegde, pp. 1-21. 
 
Christiansen, T. (2004) ‘The European Commission: The European executive between 
continuity and change’ in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union: Power and policy-
making, London: Routledge, pp. 99-121. 
 
Committee of Independent Experts (1999) First report regarding allegations of fraud, 
mismanagement and nepotism in the European Commission, 15 March. 
 
Dimitrakopoulos, D. G., (ed.) (2004) The Changing European Commission, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
European Commission (2005) Progress Report on the Commission Reform beyond the 
Reform Mandate, Com 668 final, 21 December. 
 
European Commission (2004) Completing the reform mandate: Progress report and 
measures to be implemented in 2004 , COM(2004) 93 final, 2 February. 
 
European Commission (2003) Progress review of reform, COM(2003) 40 final/2, 7 
February. 
 
European Commission (2000a) Strategic Objectives 2000-2005: Shaping the new 
Europe, Com(2000) 154 final, 9 February. 
 
European Commission (2000b) Reforming the Commission: White Paper, Part I, 
Com(2000) 200 final/2. 
 
European Commission (2000c) Reforming the Commission: White Paper, Part II, 
Com(2000) 200 final/2. 
 European Commission (1999) General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 
1998, Brussels: European Commission. 
 
European Commission (1998) General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 
1997, Brussels: European Commission. 
 
European Commission (1990) The Commission’s approach to the management of 
resources, Sec(90) 1876 final, 10 October. 
 
Hay, R. (1989) ‘The European Commission and the administration of the Community’ 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
 
Hood, C. (1991) ‘A Public Management for all seasons?’ Public Management 69: 3-19. 
 
Hosli, M. O., A. van Deemen and M. Widgren (eds) Institutional challenges in the 
European Union, London: Routlegde. 
 
Kassim, H. (2004) ‘A historic accomplishment: The Prodi Commission and 
administrative reform’ in Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), The Changing European 
Commission, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 33-62. 
 
Kinnock, N. (2004) ‘Reforming the European Commission: Organizational challenges 
and advances’ Public Policy and Administration 19: 3, 7-12. 
 
Laffan, B. (1997) The Finances of the EU, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. 
 
Levy, R. (2006) ‘European Commission overload and the pathology of management 
reform: Garbage cans, rationality and risk aversion’ Public Administration 84(2): 423-
439. 
 
Metcalfe, L. (1999) ‘Reforming the Commission’ Eipascope 99(3): 3-9. 
 
Richardson, J. (ed.) (2004) European Union: Power and policy-making, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Spierenberg, D. (1979) Proposals for Reform of the Commission of the European 
Communities and its Services, 24 September 1979. 
 
Suleiman, E. (2003) Dismantling Democratic States, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Van der Hoek, P. (2005) Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European 
Union, New York: Taylor & Francis. 
 